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ADDRESSING IMPERFECTIONS IN THE TAX 
SYSTEM: PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE 
REFORM? 
Leandra Lederman* and Stephen W. Mazza** 
PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX 
SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH - AND CHEAT EVERYBODY 
ELSE. By David Cay Johnston. New York: Penguin Group Inc. 2003. 
Pp. iii, 338. $25.95. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Books about tax administration tend to fall into one of two broad 
categories: those that paint the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") as 
an agency peopled by corrupt, out-of-control bureaucrats who take 
pleasure in seeing innocent taxpayers suffer,1 and those that tell 
readers how to structure their affairs to minimize the risk of incurring 
an IRS employee's wrath during a tax audit.2 Perfectly Legal, the full 
* Visiting William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana University School of Law 
- Bloomington and Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. AB. 1987, 
Bryn Mawr College; J.D. 1990, New York University; LL.M. (Taxation) 1993, New York 
University. - Ed. The authors would like to thank Ajay Mehrotra for helpful comments on 
a prior draft of this Review; Craig Lerner for helpful discussions; Brian Glazer for research 
assistance; and the Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington and the University of 
Kansas School of Law for financial support. 
** Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. B.S. 1989, Samford 
University; J.D. 1992, University of Alabama; LL.M. (Taxation) 1993, New York University. 
-Ed. 
1. See, e.g. , SHELLEY L. DAVIS, UNBRIDLED POWER: INSIDE THE SECRET CULTURE OF 
THE IRS (1997) (describing the author's experiences as an IRS historian and the charges of 
ethical and legal violations on the part of IRS employees that she made during her tenure); 
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR. & WILLIAM H. NIXON, THE POWER TO DESTROY 14 (1999) 
(describing the IRS as an agency with "unchecked power" and having a "culture of isolation 
that protects against interference and oversight"); RICHARD YANCEY, CONFESSIONS OF A 
TAX COLLECTOR: ONE MAN'S TOUR OF DUTY INSIDE THE IRS (2004) (recounting the 
author's experiences as an IRS collection agent and the misconduct and abuse allegedly 
carried out by fellow IRS employees). But cf DONALD L. BARLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, 
THE GREAT AMERICAN TAX DODGE: How SPIRALING FRAUD AND AVOIDANCE ARE 
KILLING FAIRNESS, DESTROYING THE INCOME TAX, AND COSTING You (2000) (discussing 
the rise in tax evasion and Congress's role in limiting IRS enforcement of the tax laws). 
2 See, e.g., AMIR D. ACZEL, How TO BEAT THE I.RS. AT ITS OWN GAME (2d ed. 
1995); FREDERICK W. DAILY, STAND UP TO THE IRS (6th ed. 2001); ARNOLD S. 
GOLDSTEIN, How TO SETTLE WITH THE IRS . . .  FOR PENNIES ON THE DOLLAR (2d ed. 
1423 
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title of which communicates David Cay Johnston's intent to focus on 
the tax system, does neither of those things. Instead, it is a book much 
like The Great American Tax Dodge,3 which explained the many 
varieties of tax fraud; the difficulties the IRS faces in pursuing high­
income individuals; the influence the affluent have on lawmaking; and 
Congress's success in tying the hands of the IRS. 
In its strongest chapters, Perfectly Legal examines the inner 
workings of the IRS and describes the agency in a very different 
way from that represented in the popular press. While other authors 
may decry the threat of overzealous IRS agents, Johnston laments 
the inability of IRS employees to pursue known acts of noncompliance 
because of resource limitations and political pressures. While 
other authors may complain about the complexity of the Internal 
Revenue Code, leaving readers with the impression that the IRS 
is responsible for its enactment, Johnston lays blame for this 
complexity squarely where it belongs - with Congress and executive 
branch policymakers.4 
Johnston's coverage of tax issues as an investigative reporter for 
the New York Times won him a Pulitzer Prize in 2001. Although many 
of Johnston's articles focus on complex issues of tax policy and 
administration - such as the restructuring of the IRS or efforts to 
repeal the estate tax - he, unlike most other journalists who attempt 
to tackle tax issues in the general press, is able to explain these 
difficult concepts in a thorough and engaging manner. Johnston's 
exposes, particularly those relating to the growth of the tax shelter 
industry in recent years, illustrate his formidable investigatory skills. 
While IRS officials may not be willing to admit as much, his articles 
apparently have brought to light a number of tax dodges that, if not 
for his reports, might still be hidden from government regulators.5 
As its prologue suggests, Perfectly Legal draws in part on stories 
Johnston published in the New York Times.6 The prologue explains 
1997); MARTIN s. KAPLAN, WHAT THE IRS DOESN'T WANT You TO KNOW: A CPA 
REVEALS THE TRICKS OF THE TRADE (9th ed. 2004). Even this category of books sometimes 
cannot help but take aim at the IRS. See KAPLAN, supra, at 6 (describing the "long, 
powerful, and often ruthless and arbitrary arm of the IRS"). 
3. BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 1. Unlike The Great American Tax Dodge, Perfectly 
Legal does not focus only on tax issues. See infra text accompanying notes 6-7. 
4. For a similar approach, see BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 1. 
5. See David Cay Johnston, U.S. Accuses 2 Audit Firms of Assisting Tax Violations, N.Y. 
nMES, July 10, 2002, at Cl (reporting that the IRS learned of tax shelters marketed by 
accounting firm KPMG from an article in the New York Times). 
6. For example, as discussed below, Johnston recounts in Perfectly Legal the situation of 
David and Margaret Klaassen, a couple surprised to be hit by the alternative minimum tax. 
See infra text accompanying notes 36-41. Portions of Johnston's discussion of the Klaassens 
originally appeared in the New York Times. See David Cay Johnston, Funny, They Don't 
Look Like Fat Cats, N.Y. nMEs, Jan. 10, 1999, § 3, at 1. 
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that Johnston's initial goal in covering taxes was "to launch a running 
investigation" of the tax system (p. 1). Many of the chapters of 
Perfectly Legal do not discuss tax issues, however. Instead, they 
criticize such things as an increase in income inequality over the past 
thirty or so years and a tendency Johnston finds on the part of large 
corporations to prioritize compensating their key executives while 
disregarding the needs of the rank-and-file workers. Johnston claims 
that, because "there is no free lunch," the super rich "leave part of 
their bill on your table" (p. 11). According to Johnston, politicians and 
their campaign contributors are behind this trend, though the 
connection is not always made explicit.7 The tax system is but one 
piece of the dark picture Johnston's completed puzzle depicts. 
The chapters that do focus on taxation discuss issues that range 
from the specific and technical to larger issues of IRS enforcement. 
The theme that implicitly ties together Johnston's complaints about 
growing income inequality, the priorities of large corporations, 
decreasing progressivity in the federal tax system, and Congress's 
"handcuff[ing of] the tax police" (p. 150) is that low-income and 
middle-income individuals are fighting just to survive, while the well­
to-do are doing better and better. In fact, much of Perfectly Legal is 
comprised of narratives about particular individuals, some of whom 
appear to represent, for Johnston, an entire class of people, such as the 
working poor, the middle class, or "the political donor class." 
Given the broad range of topics that Perfectly Legal covers, it is 
unfortunate that it is not divided into parts. Some chapters are clearly 
connected to chapters they precede or follow while others essentially 
stand alone. As the next Part of this Review suggests, the first half of 
Perfectly Legal is particularly disjointed; it addresses a variety of 
seemingly unconnected issues, ranging from demographic trends to 
public disclosure of executive compensation to specific tax loopholes. 
Following that description of the book in Part II, Part III of this 
7. The tax theme expressed in the prologue, which reappears periodically in the rest of 
the book, is that "our tax system now levies the poor, the middle class and even the upper 
middle class to subsidize the rich . . . .  " P. 2. When comparing relative tax burdens, 
Johnston's focus, though generally not explicit, is the percentage of their income particular 
classes of individuals pay in taxes, not the absolute amount of taxes they pay. Thus, one of 
his principal claims is that lower-income individuals are taxed at a higher rate than higher­
income individuals - in other words, that the combined federal income tax/social security 
system, in practice, is regressive: 
[W]hen all federal taxes are considered - from those on gasoline and beer to Social Security 
taxes as well as income and estate taxes - the [richest] 1 percent's share drops to about a 
fourth of the total tax bill . . . .  If you tally up the economic benefits of the top 1 percent that 
do not show up in income statistics . . .  then the richest 1 percent are taxed more lightly than 
the middle class. The same data show that the poor are taxed almost as heavily as the rich 
are - and even more heavily than the super rich. 
P. 11. 
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Review provides further critique and Part IV suggests a line of inquiry 
for future analysis of tax administration. 
II. THE BOOK'S STRUCTURE AND PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS 
Perfectly Legal begins by introducing Jonathan Blattmachr, an 
attorney who specializes in finding loopholes that enable the wealthy 
to save taxes. The purpose the story serves in the book can be 
summarized in a statement Johnston attributes to Blattmachr: "The 
U.S. tax code is the most political law in the world" (p. 9). Chapter 
One also serves as an introduction to some of the topics discussed in 
later chapters, such as a number of tax compliance issues, including 
marketed tax shelters, corporate inversions, and difficulties in 
detecting certain types of tax evasion, as well as IRS reform resulting 
from Senate Finance Committee hearings in 1997 and 1998 (pp. 11-
14). It also introduces Johnston's underlying theme that wealth 
concentration in the United States is partly due to a tax system that 
taxes the "super rich" more lightly than others (p. 11). 
Johnston connects that claim with the notion that the super rich 
can hire attorneys like Mr. Blattmachr to develop strategies under 
which money can change hands "without showing up in the official 
statistics on wealth and income" (p. 11). Not only that, but super-rich 
individuals have more opportunities to evade taxes because they 
generally are not wage earners and receive less income subject to 
information reporting; "their friends in Congress have slashed budgets 
for inspecting the tax returns of the rich and super rich"; and, if they 
own businesses, they can live subsidized lifestyles by charging some of 
their expenses to their businesses (p. 13). Johnston argues, "[s ]ince at 
least 1983 it has been the explicit, but unstated, policy in Washington 
to let the richest Americans pay a smaller portion of their incomes in 
taxes and to defer more of their taxes . . . while collecting more in 
taxes from those in the middle class" (p. 18). 
After the first chapter, Johnston turns to a discussion of 
demographic trends, focusing primarily on changes in the U.S. 
economy in the last thirty to thirty-five years. His principal point is 
that, once earnings are adjusted for inflation, the salaries of most 
Americans have remained relatively flat while "the incomes of those 
at the very top soared" (p. 29), resulting in increased income 
inequality.8 Johnston also discusses a trend over the same thirty or so 
years towards lower top income tax brackets and increased 
government reliance on Social Security revenue, which, because of its 
8. In his discussion of an increase in average house size, Johnston points out that the 
home mortgage interest deduction provides a bigger subsidy for higher-income individuals 
and those who buy bigger houses. Pp. 21-22. 
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wage-base cap and lack of zero bracket, disproportionately burdens 
low-income individuals (p. 41). 
Johnston connects growing income inequality with increased 
compensation for managers of large corporations. This created a 
demand for corporate tax shelters to keep profits high, "which helped 
shift the overall tax burden off capital and onto labor" (p. 41). 
Johnston blames Congress and other "lawmakers" for funneling 
benefits to "Corporate America" by allowing the demise of personal 
liability for the acts of other partners in a firm,9 facilitating the "spread 
of 401(k) plans,"10 and "attacking" the IRS.11 
Johnston also includes a chapter on executive compensation, 
where he begins a discussion of stock compensation with a story about 
Robert Goizueta (pp. 45-47), Coca-Cola's one-time CEO. Here, 
Johnston's focus is on compensation arrangements that allow a small 
group of high-level executives to defer reporting a large portion of 
their compensation until future years (p. 47). According to Johnston, 
these "secret" arrangements are significant because they contribute to 
the "economic pain felt by millions of workers whose compensation 
was squeezed so that the top executives could take a larger share of 
the [corporation's] compensation budget" (p. 47). Johnston also 
argues that because a company cannot deduct deferred compensation, 
9. P. 42. Johnston does not mention what law he is referring to when he states that 
"lawmakers encouraged these corporate [accounting] scandals [such as those involving 
Enron and Global Crossing] by ending a single legal principle - the policy that each partner 
in an accounting or law firm was liable for the acts of every other partner." Id. It is unclear 
whether this reference to lawmakers refers to members of Congress or state legislators. See 
id. Earlier in the same paragraph, Johnston refers to "lawmakers - often passing bills they 
had not read (some of which came to the floor of the House or the Senate without a single 
public hearing)," and the prior paragraph discusses the U.S. Congress. Id. Later in the book, 
Johnston refers to the limited liability partnership ("LLP") as the "structure [that] destroys 
the self-policing mechanism that helps to keep legal and accounting firms from using their 
enormous power to the detriment of others" because the LLP eliminates personal liability 
for the acts of other partners. Pp. 258-59. Johnston points out that the Texas legislature 
passed the first limited liability partnership law. P. 259; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The New 
Choice of Entity for Entrepreneurs, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 325, 328 (1997). Johnston also states 
that it was the IRS that ruled in 1988 that a professional firm could be organized as a LLP. 
P. 259. The IRS did rule in 1988 that a Wyoming limited liability company could be taxed as 
a partnership, see Rev. Ru!. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, but that ruling does not address LLPs or 
professional firms. In 1992, the IRS issued a letter ruling upholding partnership taxation for 
a Texas LLP. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 92-29-016 (Apr. 16, 1992). 
10. P. 42. Johnston also criticizes a "federal law that requires companies to put too little 
money away in pension plans for younger workers." Id. Here, as elsewhere, Johnston does 
not state which law he is referencing. It appears from an article he published in 1995, David 
Cay Johnston, The Fading Pension, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1995, at Dl,  that he may be referring 
to changes enacted in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. See Pub. L. No. 
103-465, § 761, 108 Stat. 4809, 5024-34 (1994). 
11. Pp. 42-43. Here, Johnston is referring to the highly publicized 1997 and 1998 
Congressional hearings on IRS reform. See infra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
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it raises the company's tax bill and is, therefore, "very expensive for 
shareholders, rank-and-file workers, and taxpayers" (p. 48). 
The theme of corporate excess and its tax cost continues with a 
chapter focusing on the valuation of company-provided personal air 
travel. Johnston points out that the valuation rules often have made it 
less expensive for an executive to fly on a company-owned plane and 
pay the associated income taxes than to fly on a commercial airliner in 
coach class (p. 62). In addition, the income tax cost to the executive 
has often been substantially less than even the direct cost to the 
company for use of the plane (p. 62). Johnston describes such 
executive "perks" as an example of a stealth tax cut for the wealthy 
and powerful, and another way in which corporations and the tax code 
can, in effect, subsidize executives' personal lifestyles.12 
After his indictment of big business, Johnston addresses a variety 
of specific tax issues. First, he discusses congressional efforts to repeal 
the estate tax. Johnston makes a convincing case that no family farms 
actually have been lost to the estate tax - the false premise that is the 
primary argument among politicians in favor of repeal - and that 
instead the beneficiaries of repeal (and the force behind the push for 
elimination of the tax) are wealthy individuals (pp. 71-79). In this 
context, he points out the power of rhetoric and slogans: "The term 
death tax is a superb example of marketing triumphing over reasoned 
debate."13 He also points out that "repeal of the estate tax means 
a heavier reliance on taxes paid during life such as income 
taxes" (p. 85). 
Johnston accuses politicians who voted for estate tax repeal of not 
only seeking to shift more of the tax burden onto wage-based income, 
but also of attempting to dramatically soften the burden on the 
wealthiest Americans by including provisions in the 2000 tax 
legislation - repeal of the gift tax combined with an unlimited basis 
step-up for assets transferred at death - that would have allowed 
individuals to transfer wealth from one generation to another while 
avoiding taxable gain (p. 86). This loophole was closed before 
Congress passed the final bill but, according to Johnston, such efforts 
"illustrate the drive by the political donor class to free itself from the 
burden of taxes" (pp. 90-91). 
12. Pp. 67-70. Johnston points out that the company can deduct the cost of the use of the 
airplane. Pp. 62, 67. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, signed by the President on 
October 22, 2004, includes a provision that limits an employer's tax deduction for an 
executive's personal use of a company aircraft to the amount included in the executive's 
income as compensation. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 
907(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1654-55. 
13. P. 81. Professor Lee Fennell points out that the broad unpopularity of the estate tax 
is puzzling given that only a tiny fraction of estates actually are subject to it, and, 
presumably, the revenue it collects forestalls increases in other taxes. See Lee Anne Fennell, 
Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 593-94 (2003). 
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Next, Johnston discusses the alternative minimum tax ("AMT"), a 
separate set of rules in the tax code originally designed to ensure that 
wealthy taxpayers paid some minimum annual tax regardless of their 
deductions and credits. Johnston focuses on how the AMT operates 
nearly invisibly under current law to reduce the value of the "Bush tax 
cuts" for many taxpayers, mostly middle-income (pp. 94-95). Johnston 
seems to object to the opacity of the AMT, which he calls the "stealth 
tax" (pp. 92, 95), its impending effect on the middle class (pp. 104, 
111), its effect on those with large families (p. 105), and what he calls 
"another levy"14 on taxpayers. 
Following the discussion of the AMT, Johnston focuses on the flip 
side of deferral, namely, payment in advance, in a chapter entitled 
"How Social Security Taxes Subsidize the Rich." He points out that, in 
recent years, workers have paid more in Social Security taxes than was 
paid out in benefits in those years, which, in effect, amounts to an 
advance payment of tax (pp. 118, 122-23). The extra funds "were used 
to pay the ordinary bills of the government, making up for the taxes 
that were no longer being paid by the rich because of the 1981 income 
tax cuts" (p. 123). Another "raid" on Social Security funds occurred in 
2001, when Congress passed a series of tax cuts, the benefits of which 
flowed largely to upper-income taxpayers (pp. 126-27). Johnston 
explains that Social Security is an income redistribution program. He 
argues that the very poor receive benefits larger than their 
contributions and the "rich get nearly a free ride" because of the wage 
cap on contributions. Returning to one of his themes, Johnston states, 
"[i]t is the middle class and the upper middle class who pay the price 
for this inequity" (p. 125). 
Chapter Nine is the first in a series of chapters that discuss the 
workings of the IRS. It focuses on audits of low-income taxpayers who 
claim the earned income credit ("EiC"), a refundable tax credit that 
can reduce or eliminate tax liability for the eligible working poor. 
Johnston points out that, "[i]n 1999, for the first time, the poor were 
more likely than the rich to have their returns audited" (p. 132). This 
is a difficult issue. The EiC requirements are complex and EiC claims 
do have a high error rate,1 5 but there is little tax money at stake in 
an audit of a low-income individual.16 Johnston recommends that 
Congress simplify the EiC and adopt a uniform definition of "child" 
14. P. 95. Johnston's analysis of the AMT is critiqued below. See infra notes 36-41 and 
accompanying text. 
15. P. 138; see also Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit 
All, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2003) ("Of the estimated $31.3 billion in EITC claims 
made by taxpayers filing in 1999, approximately $8.5 to $9.9 billion should not have been 
paid."). 
16. For example, Professor Book notes that the maximum EiC for a taxpayer with two 
qualifying children in 2002 was $4,140. Book, supra note 15, at 1194. 
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for federal income tax purposes.17 He claims that simplifying the EIC 
could reduce the amount of refund anticipation loans and check­
cashing fees the working poor pay to private businesses to accelerate 
their EIC payments (pp. 141-44). 
In the second half of the book, Johnston turns his attention more 
directly to issues of tax enforcement and the workings of the IRS, 
offering explanations for what he believes to be the Agency's failed 
enforcement practices and policies. Johnston attributes the IRS's 
failed enforcement practices primarily to structural changes brought 
about by IRS reform legislation enacted in 1998, which he 
characterizes as a "boon for tax cheats of all kinds" (p. 150). He 
recounts the circumstances surrounding the Senate Finance 
Committee hearings leading up to the 1998 legislation, at which 
taxpayers and some of the IRS's own employees testified to unlawful 
treatment by the Agency. Johnston points out that most of this 
testimony was later discredited (pp. 146, 155-56) and that the IRS 
could not adequately respond to its accusers because, by law, it must 
keep taxpayer information confidential (p. 148). Nevertheless, the 
hearings had their intended effect and Congress enacted widespread 
changes to the tax enforcement and collection process that, according 
to Johnston, "handcuffed the tax police" (p. 150). 
One change that Johnston holds in particular disdain, and that he 
believes created the greatest hindrance to the IRS's ability to enforce 
the tax laws effectively, was the enactment of the "ten deadly sins" -
a list of infractions by IRS employees for which the default sanction is 
termination of employment (p. 150). The threat of discharge, 
according to IRS personnel interviewed by Johnston, led front-line 
IRS employees to close audits quickly and to take a reluctant stance 
against well-connected, but noncompliant, taxpayers. This fear of 
reprisal, Johnston asserts, led to the documented decline in liens, 
levies, and seizures that followed IRS reform.18 
In Chapter Eleven, Johnston discusses another important 
structural change brought about by the 1998 legislation - a 
17. Pp. 140, 144. There has been a movement for such a change for a while. For 
example, the National Taxpayer Advocate included such a proposal in her 2001 report to 
Congress. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 76, 80 (2001), at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2001_tas.pdf. Recently enacted legislation includes such a 
change. See Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §§ 201, 205, 118 
Stat. 1166, 1169, 1176. 
18. Pp. 151-52. Others have stated this as well. See, e.g., BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 
1, at 131; Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial 
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 107 
(2004); Amy Hamilton, Ten Deadly Sins: Effective Tool or Invitation to Employee 
Harassment?, 85 TAX NOTES 1360 (1999); Ann Murphy & David Higer, The JO Deadly Sins: 
A Law With Unintended Consequences, 96 TAX NOTES 871 (2002); Lee A. Sheppard, The 
Sixth Deadly Sin, 92 TAX NOTES 1018 (2001). 
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congressionally mandated reorganization of the IRS's organizational 
structure. The primary architect of the reorganization plan, and the 
IRS Commissioner who oversaw the plan's initial implementation, was 
Charles Rossotti. Johnston criticizes Rossotti's efforts in bringing 
cultural change to the IRS as being too heavily focused on so-called 
"customer" service at the expense of enforcement (p. 163). Johnston 
attributes much of the dramatic, across-the-board decline in audit 
rates during Rossotti's tenure (pp. 164-66) to decisions by Rossotti and 
IRS officials to direct enforcement resources toward low-income 
taxpayers, whose returns tend to be easier to audit but yield lower 
collections, rather than higher-income and business taxpayers, whose 
returns tend to be more complicated but more likely to generate 
higher tax collections.19 
In a series of chapters criticizing the IRS's enforcement activities, 
Johnston offers examples of the IRS's inaction in the face of known 
acts of noncompliance. He recounts the tale of Jerry Curnutt, an 
IRS expert responsible for identifying erroneous partnership tax 
returns. After discovering entries on returns that might indicate 
fraudulent activity, Curnutt proposed a low-cost solution that, 
according to Johnston, would have generated millions of dollars in 
taxes due. Curnutt's proposal apparently drew little interest from his 
supervisors, which Johnston attributes to several factors, including 
political influence from wealthy campaign contributors (p. 172), lack 
of IRS funding (p. 182), and general mismanagement of the Agency 
(pp. 180-83). 
Johnston also exposes the use of tax-exempt insurance companies 
to shelter hundreds of millions in investment profits from U.S. taxes 
(pp. 186-93) and identifies, by name, individuals who have invested in 
schemes designed to zero-out their tax liability, as well as others who 
simply have refused to file income tax returns (pp. 194-96, 201-02). In 
the face of these revelations, Johnston reports, the IRS showed a 
reluctance to, and in some cases seemingly refused to, pursue these 
individuals. According to Johnston, such noncompliance is a "rip in 
the social fabric that holds the nation together" (p. 203) and continues 
to grow because of IRS inaction. 
As noted above,20 Johnston often is at his best when discussing 
complex tax transactions. Chapter Sixteen, which analyzes the 
background, tax implications, and policy debate surrounding the cross­
border dividend-stripping transaction at issue in the Compaq case,21 
19. Pp. 166-67. Later in the book, Johnston praises Rossotti for recognizing the negative 
effect his policies had on overall levels of tax compliance. P. 293. 
20. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
21. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev'd, 277 F.3d 778 (5th 
Cir. 2001). 
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illustrates Johnston's gift for taking an otherwise dry topic and 
infusing it with interest and importance.22 Johnston's discussion of 
efforts by U.S. businesses to reincorporate in tax haven countries in 
order to reduce their corporate tax liability is equally engaging. He 
entertainingly recounts the political debate surrounding the efforts by 
Stanley Works's management to convince shareholders to approve a 
reincorporation plan (pp. 237-50). Not part of the debate, Johnston 
points out, was the huge tax-free profits Stanley's high-level 
management would have realized had the reincorporation plan 
passed (p. 247). 
While Johnston is highly critical of the IRS throughout the second 
half of the book,23 he makes it clear that its failure cannot be 
attributed solely to the Agency's bureaucracy and inefficiency. He 
returns to the notion of an influential "political donor class," that, 
according to Johnston, not only influences the development of tax 
policy, but also affects the Agency's enforcement practices.24 Although 
Johnston offers little direct evidence to support his belief, 
characterizing these themes as mere conspiracy theory would do a 
disservice to Johnston's skills as an investigative reporter. Facts 
uncovered by Johnston strongly suggest that IRS supervisors refused 
to support the conclusions of IRS agents who were auditing big oil 
companies like Unocal and Chevron, thereby raising serious 
questions about the IRS's priorities relating to enforcing the law and 
collecting revenue.2 5 
Of course, the "political donor class" must necessarily draw its 
influence from politicians, so members of Congress, both Republican 
22. Pp. 220-27. Foreign tax credit manipulation of the type at issue in Compaq 
represents one of the few instances Johnston reports in which Congress acted to shut down, 
at least partially, a tax shelter-type transaction. See I.RC. § 901(k) (imposing a holding 
period requirement for purposes of crediting foreign taxes associated with foreign-source 
dividends). More recently, Congress passed a host of provisions designed to further curtail 
the use of abusive tax-avoidance transactions, including expanded tax shelter disclosure 
requirements and increased penalties applicable to tax shelter promoters. American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 815(a), 818(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1581, 1584. 
23. Throughout Perfectly Legal, Johnston describes the IRS as an agency subject to 
political manipulation and an unworthy adversary of those in the legal and accounting 
community. Johnston's stories in this regard appear not to be intended to generate sympathy 
for the IRS, but rather to stand as a strong critique of an IRS management unwilling to 
confront political pressure and of a Congress that intentionally underfunds the Agency. 
24. P. 216 (reporting that twenty percent of IRS managers routinely observed 
preferential treatment given to taxpayers with "political clout"). 
25. Pp. 252-53. Similar accusations arose in 2004 relating to the IRS's audit of Micrel, 
Inc. See Warren Rojas, Agent Says IRS Used Disclosure, Circular Referrals to Block Audit, 
104 TAX NOTES 687 (2004) (IRS agent accused of wrongdoing after making public 
allegations of collusion between corporation under examination and senior IRS executives). 
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and Democrat, do not fare well in Johnston's book.2 6  Johnston accuses 
politicians not only of creating a hostile atmosphere toward tax 
enforcement, but also of underfunding the IRS in an effort to tie its 
hands (p. 295). He also attributes blame for the current state of tax 
enforcement to judges who ignore financial reality in favor of 
textualist constructions (pp. 224-26), lawyers who facilitate tax dodges 
by providing a sense of legitimacy to otherwise questionable 
transactions (p. 273), and accountants and advisors who market tax­
saving schemes (pp. 269-70). 
The prospects for improvement, in Johnston's mind, are dim. In 
the chapter entitled "ls Reform Possible?" Johnston relates efforts by 
politicians to block then-departing Commissioner Rossetti from 
issuing before Congress a stinging criticism of the IRS's enforcement 
activities and a call for increased Agency resources (pp. 292-96). As 
Johnston sees it, the spread of tax cheating is a predictable outcome of 
the government's failure to direct audit resources towards business 
owners and investors who have the greatest opportunity to cheat. 
Addressing some of the compliance problems through substantive 
reform of the income tax also presents serious challenges, according to 
Johnston, because of the capacity of lawyers and accountants to help 
clients manipulate the system and the recent penchant of Congress to 
make the tax code more complex.27 Johnston raises the possibility of a 
switch from an income tax to a consumption tax, but seems to reject 
the idea, criticizing consumption taxes as regressive and skewed in 
favor of the rich, and a transition to such a tax as potentially 
economically disruptive (pp. 300-04). Fundamental reform, according 
to Johnston, "will remain elusive so long as Congress avoids the 
serious, and mundane, issues of how tax administration works, puts [] 
willfully uninformed [Congressmen] in charge of IRS oversight and 
shrivels the budget for tax law enforcement while handcuffing the tax 
police" (p. 304). 
Ill. DOES PERFECTLY LEGAL LIVE UPTO ITS SUBTITLE? 
Perfectly Legal is a smooth and engaging read. Johnston is an 
excellent storyteller; he makes ordinary people and technical issues 
seem to come alive on the page. The stories work well as newspaper 
columns, where a single issue can be the focus. Unfortunately, the 
compilation of stories does not work as well as a book. Johnston 
2 6. Johnston does attempt to present a balanced picture, noting instances in which 
Congress acted to curtail tax schemes. Seep. 22 7. 
2 7. P. 2 98 ("Any real reform of our tax system must address the virtually unlimited 
capacity of financial engineers to fabricate profits and losses, to hide them in layers of 
complex transactions and to withhold documents that would enable auditors to understand 
these transactions."). 
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simply does not explain how the various topics fit together, nor does 
he make links between them.2 8 If the book were divided into parts, 
each focused on a different aspect of Johnston's concern about the 
suffering of the "little guy" at the hands of politicians and their 
donors, it would be a better book. To do that, though, Johnston would 
have to give up the premise that the book is a comprehensive report 
on the tax system and admit that, in his view, the tax system is just one 
component of the problem. 
Even then, the book would need more work to make its case that 
politicians and their donors are rigging the "system" (however 
defmed) to harm the little guy. Certain chapters show quite 
persuasively that the effect of Congress's actions has been to cut taxes 
on the rich (notably, the estate tax repeal) or hamper tax collection 
(IRS reform). The facts reported in these chapters make a good case 
that these actions were no accident. In other chapters, however, the 
connection between political action and a burden on the poor or a tax 
break for the rich is left unstated. Is Johnston implying that such a 
connection exists? 
There is a similar issue with respect to the corporate greed that 
Johnston laments. Johnston seems to ignore market forces, acting as if 
employees whose compensation or benefits are cut have no 
opportunity to seek jobs elsewhere, likely exaggerating the effects of 
the phenomena he discusses. But, assuming that he is correct, to what 
extent does Johnston blame politicians? The links Johnston makes 
between corporate activity and acts of Congress seem tenuous at best 
- Johnston does not explain the connection between them. 
In addition, Johnston's economic analysis, though clearly not 
intended to be overly technical, is inconsistent at times. One of 
Johnston's themes is that there is "no free lunch,"29 so that when one 
group lowers its taxes, another group has to bear the cost of that 
forgone revenue.30 The basic principle that Johnston is expressing is as 
true of corporate taxpayers as it is of individual taxpayers (p. 12). 
28. By contrast, The Great American Tax Dodge, which is similar in many ways to 
Perfectly Legal, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, expresses a clear theme to which 
each of its chapters relate. This makes The Great American Tax Dodge clearer and more 
convincing. 
29. Johnston uses this phrase both to refer to taxes that are not paid by the rich, p. 11, 
and in the context of the cost of "the true price of deferral," p. 52. 
30. Johnston also does not mention that some economists believe that lower taxes may 
spur growth in the economy, leading to the same amount of tax collections in the aggregate, 
while lowering the burden imposed on each taxpayer. See, e.g. , JOHN 0. Fox, IF AMERICANS 
REALLY UNDERSTOOD THE INCOME TAX: UNCOVERING OUR MOST EXPENSIVE 
IGNORANCE 165-66 (2001). 
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Thus, if a corporate taxpayer lowers its tax bill, the rest of us will have 
to pay more.31 
What about when a corporate taxpayer pays a larger tax bill? 
When discussing executive compensation, Johnston complains that 
when a company does not get a tax deduction for compensation paid, 
"shareholders had to pay an extra 35 cents [per nondeductible dollar 
of salary] to cover additional corporate income taxes" (p. 56). 
Assuming that a corporation is actually paying taxes at a thirty-five 
percent rate - an assumption that contradicts the statistics Johnston 
cites elsewhere32 - then, all other things being equal, a forgone 
deduction costs a corporation thirty-five cents on the dollar. Johnston 
points out that either the shareholders may bear that cost (pp. 48, 56) 
or the cost may be passed along, such as through elimination of jobs or 
reduction of employee benefits (pp. 51-53). 
Thus, Johnston finds possible burdens on people such as "rank and 
file workers" from both tax increases and tax cuts. The problem is that 
Johnston is looking only at one side of each equation. In the context of 
a tax cut for large corporations, Johnston's main point is that, if one 
group pays less in tax, others must pay more, in order for tax revenue 
to stay the same (assuming no growth in the economy - an issue 
Johnston does not address). 33 In the context of higher taxes for large 
corporations, the crux of Johnston's argument seems to be that if a 
company spends more on taxes, it must spend less elsewhere, such as 
on the compensation of rank-and-file employees, in order for after-tax 
profits to stay the same34 (assuming market prices have not changed). 
What Johnston does not mention are corollaries to each of his 
arguments: Under Johnston's analysis, (1) if a corporation pays less in 
taxes and were to keep after-tax profits the same,35 it would 
accordingly spend more elsewhere, such as on its employees, and (2) if 
large corporations pay more in taxes and tax revenues stay the same, 
then others should experience a tax cut. 
31. For example, in Chapter Five, Johnston states, "Someone must bear the real costs of 
the use of company jets. They are borne by the shareholders, who may in tum deduct them 
on the corporate income tax return, forcing all taxpayers to pick up 35 percent of the true 
costs." P. 62. 
32. Johnston notes that "[c)orporations . . .  lowered the portion of their profits that go to 
federal income taxes from 26 cents of each dollar in 1993 to 22 cents in 1998, even though 
the official corporate income tax rate remained unchanged at 35 percent." P. 12. He also 
laments the rise of corporate tax shelters. Seep. 41. 
33. See supra note 30. 
34. Johnston does not say this explicitly but it seems implicit in his statement that "[t)he 
true price of deferral may be hidden, but it still must be paid somehow and by someone," 
p. 52, and in other statements about the costs of deferral, including shrinking payrolls. See 
pp. 48, 51-53. 
35. Of course, a corporation facing reduced tax liability may simply enjoy an increase in 
after-tax profits. 
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Johnston's discussion of the AMT similarly presents only part of 
the picture. As indicated above, an important focus of Johnston's 
discussion is how the AMT reduces the value of the "Bush tax cuts" 
for many taxpayers (pp. 94-95). For example, he states, "[b]etween 
2003 and 2012 the Bush tax cuts will force an increase of $560 billion 
in taxes to be paid under the alternative minimum tax" (p. 95). It is 
probably the case that the loss of much-touted tax cuts was a surprise 
for many taxpayers. And it is certainly true that nonobvious and 
complex provisions impose costs on taxpayers. Johnston's discussion 
could imply that a tax cut actually increased federal income tax 
liability for some taxpayers, however. 
As Johnston points out, the taxpayer pays the higher of the 
amount computed under the regular income tax or the AMT (p. 95). 
Thus, a taxpayer paying AMT is, by definition, paying more in taxes 
than he would if the AMT did not apply. And a taxpayer-favorable 
change under the regular tax without a corresponding change in the 
AMT will make more people liable for AMT, all other things being 
equal. But those two points combined do not add up to increased 
overall federal income tax liability resulting from the availability of a 
benefit under the regular tax. 
For example, Johnston discusses the Klaassens, a family with ten 
children in 1994 who owed $1,085 more in tax than they had paid 
because they had not realized the AMT applied and had calculated 
their tax liability applying only the regular income tax (p. 105). 
According to Johnston, the calculations of Mr. Klaassen, a lawyer, 
revealed that "the [Klaassens'] eighth child set off the alternative tax 
at a cost of $223. A ninth child raised the bill to $717. And ten 
children, the number the Klaassens had in 1994, increased the tax bill 
by $1,085, the exact amount the IRS said was due in extra taxes for 
1994" (p. 105). 
Johnston does not report the amount of the Klaassens' income or 
deductions, but the Tax Court opinion in Klaassen v. Commissioner 
does,3 6  so it is possible to calculate their regular tax liability and AMT 
under the scenarios Johnston raises. Although it is true that the 
Klaassens' eighth child caused the AMT to apply to them in 1994 in 
36. Klaassen v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 20 (1998), affd, 182 F.3d 932 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(unpublished op.). According to the Tax Court opinion, for 1994, the Klaassens reported 
adjusted gross income ("AGI") of $83,056.42, itemized deductions of $19,563.95, which 
included $4,767.13 of medical and dental expenses and $3,263.56 of state and local taxes; 
exemptions of $29,400 (two personal exemptions and ten dependency exemptions, at $2,450 
each); taxable income of $34,092.47; and regular tax of $5,111. Id. In 1994, married taxpayers 
were taxed at a rate of fifteen percent on taxable income up to $38,000 and at a twenty-eight 
percent rate after that. See Rev. Proc. 93-49, 1993-2 C.B. 581, 582, § 3.01 tbl.1. Fifteen 
percent of $34,092.47 is $5,113. The 1994 tax table, however, provides $5,111 as the tax on 
$34,050 to $34,100. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040, at 45 (1994), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-94/i1040.pdf. 
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the amount of $223,37 that does not mean the Klaassens would have 
paid less in federal income tax if they had had seven children instead 
of eight or more. 
According to the IRS's computations, which the Klaassens did not 
dispute, the Klaassens' tentative minimum tax for 1994 was $6,196, 
giving rise to AMT of $1,085.38 If the Klaassens had had only seven 
children in 1994, their tentative minimum tax would have remained 
the same, $6,196, because dependency exemptions are disallowed 
under the AMT.39 With seven children, however, the Klaassens would 
have had a regular tax liability of $6,659"0 - an amount that would 
have exceeded their tentative minimum tax.41 Thus, if the Klaassens 
had had seven children in 1994, they would have owed no AMT but 
would have owed $463 more in federal income tax for 1994 than their 
actual liability of $6,196. Therefore, it is not the case that the 
Klaassen's eighth child increased their federal income tax liability. In 
fact, the opposite is true. Their eighth child reduced their tax liability 
by $463, and their federal income tax liability remained flat with their 
ninth and tenth children. 
Of course there are problems with the AMT. Among other issues, 
if the AMT continues on its current trajectory, it will become a mass 
tax, which was not intended when it was enacted. 42 As Johnston points 
37. If the Klaassens had had eight children in 1994, their tentative minimum tax would 
have remained at $6,196, while their regular tax liability would have been $5,973 according 
to the tax tables. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR FORM 1040, at 45 (1994), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-94/i1040.pdf. It would have been 
$5,977 according to the tax rate charts. The difference between $6,196 and $5,973 is $223, the 
amount Johnston refers to as the AMT cost of the Klaassens' eighth child. P. 105. If the 
Klaassens had had nine children, their tentative minimum tax for 1994 would once again 
have remained at $6,196, while their regular tax liability would have decreased to $5,479 
according to the tax tables. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040, at 45 (1994), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-94/i1040.pdf. It 
would be $5,481 according to the tax rate charts, or fifteen percent of $36,542. See id. Thus, 
with nine children, the Klaassens' AMT liability would be $717, just as Johnston reported. P. 
105. 
38. P. 105. In 1994, the AMT applied a flat exemption of $45,000 but disallowed the 
personal and dependency exemptions and the standard deduction. See I.R.C. §§ 55(d), 
56(b)(l)(E) (1994); see also Klaassen, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2. The 1994 AMT applied a rate 
of twenty-six percent at the Klaassens' income level. I.R.C. § 55(b)(l)(A)(i)(I) (1994); see 
also Klaassen, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2. 
39. See supra note 38. 
40. With only seven children, rather than ten, the Klaassens would have had three fewer 
dependency exemptions for purposes of the regular federal income tax, increasing their 
taxable income to $41,442 ($34,092 + $2,450 * 3 = $41,442). Using the tax tables would yield 
a tax liability of $6,659. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040, at 46 (1994), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-94/i1040.pdf. 
41. Thus, the Klaassens' AMT liability for 1994 would have been zero if they had had 
seven children, but that is because their regular tax liability would have been higher than 
their tentative minimum tax. 
42. As one article comments: 
1438 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1423 
out, however, that will likely not be the case until approximately 2010 
(pp. 99-100). By then, if the AMT still exists, the tax law will likely 
have changed so that the effect of the AMT on individuals may be 
very different than it is now. 
Despite these shortcomings in Johnston's discussion of the AMT, 
Johnston has provided a service in pointing out how AMT liability can 
be a trap for the unwary. Certainly a taxpayer who assumes that 
additional children will always lower tax liability is incorrect because 
of the AMT. Johnston's voice is a powerful one in promoting change 
and his focus on important tax policy issues that can be daunting 
in their technicality, such as the AMT and corporate tax shelters, 
is commendable. 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL REFORM? THE COSTS OF 
PROCEDURAL COMPLEXITY 
In the final chapter of Perfectly Legal, entitled "Conclusions," 
Johnston sums up his various arguments and makes several proposals. 
Initially, he calls for a complete overhaul of the tax system (p. 305), 
but he quickly backs away from this large-scale plan in favor of a 
series of more modest proposals that, he believes, would reverse the 
trend of shifting the tax burden from high-income to middle-income 
taxpayers.43 These proposals include limiting a taxpayer's ability to 
defer reporting income to "very limited amounts in retirement savings 
plans and pension funds" (p. 313), requiring corporations to calculate 
tax liability based on financial accounting concepts (p. 313), 
eliminating special tax treatment limited to only certain industries,44 
The AMT grew out of a minimum tax that first took effect in 1970, due to legislation enacted 
in response to public outrage in the wake of testimony by Treasury Secretary Joseph W. 
Barr (1969) that 155 high-income households had paid no income tax in 1966. Although it 
has historically applied to only a very small share of taxpayers, the tax is projected to grow 
rapidly over the next decade, transforming it from a class tax to a mass tax. 
Leonard E. Burman et al., The AMT: Projections and Problems, 100 TAX NOTES 105,  105 
(2003). In 2001 and again in 2003, Congress increased the exemption amounts under the 
AMT, see I.R.C. § 55(d), thereby relieving some taxpayers of AMT liability. The increased 
exemption amounts were extended to tax years 2005 and 2006 by the Working Families Tax 
Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311,  § 103, 118 Stat. 1166, 1 168. 
43. Pp. 312-17. He also calls for a serious debate over a possible move to a consumption 
tax, but it seems clear that he does not favor such a move because it would shift the tax 
burden onto labor and away from capital. P. 310. Johnston points out that recent legislative 
changes - reducing tax rates on capital gain and dividend income, for instance - have 
shifted tax burdens away from capital and onto labor. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 30l(a), 302; I.RC. § l(h)(l), (11). These 
changes have moved the current nominal income tax closer in application to a consumption 
tax. See generally DA YID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986) (comparing 
a pure income tax and an income-based consumption tax). 
44. P. 314. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418, 
is a recent example of the type of tax legislation Johnston laments. Passed by Congress in 
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overhauling the U.S. tax treatment of multinational corporations (p. 
314), enacting legislation that would allow "each American a one-time 
opportunity to start a business and pay no taxes on profits for the first 
two or three years" (p. 314), eliminating limited liability for 
partnerships composed of accountants and lawyers (p. 314), and 
reforming or eliminating the alternative minimum tax (p. 315). 
Some of Johnston's proposals for substantive change, such as his 
proposal to exempt new businesses from taxes, would add further 
complexity to an already complex tax code. 4 5  Other proposals, such as 
reformation or repeal of the alternative minimum tax, might entail 
simplification depending on how they were done. Johnston is quite 
concerned with complexity in tax law; he states that "[t]he most 
overwhelming need is to simplify the tax code" (p. 312). But 
simplification is not the principal driver of Johnston's reform 
proposals. Instead, what apparently animates these proposals is the 
theme that reappears throughout the book: the reduction of income 
inequality. Johnston's proposals are attempts to achieve that goal by 
assisting the lower and middle classes and reducing tax breaks that 
benefit the "super rich. " 46 
Johnston also proposes a series of procedural reforms directed at 
the tax enforcement and collection process. Among other things, he 
advances some general ideas about enforcement measures that the 
IRS could add to its repertoire.47 Johnston also declares that Congress 
should "unshackle the tax police" by ordering the IRS to pursue more 
aggressively both acts of noncompliance and those tax practitioners 
who facilitate noncompliance by their clients (p. 316). The extent to 
which lawmakers and the IRS, on its own initiative, have begun this 
process is open to debate. For the past several years, the Bush 
October of 2004, the legislation provides tax benefits for manufacturing concerns, the 
aviation and shipping industries, restaurant owners, and Alaskan whaling captains, among 
others. 
45. Johnston points out that many new businesses are not initially profitable, anyway. 
P. 314. 
46. Barlett and Steele offer a proposal in The Great American Tax Dodge that is 
designed not only to address the issues of wealth and income inequality, but also to reduce 
the substantive complexity of the federal income tax. They recommend replacing the current 
income tax with a simplified, highly progressive income tax. See BARLETT & STEELE, supra 
note 1, at 261-63. Their proposal is both more comprehensive and more ambitious than 
Johnston's set of recommendations, and would also entail more radical change to the tax 
system if adopted. 
47. Johnston states: 
Congress . . .  should order them [the "tax police"] to aggressively pursue people who do not 
pay any taxes or pay on only a slice of their income. Comparing income to zip codes, buying 
lists of newly formed businesses and otherwise making sure no one can get away without 
filing a tax return would be both fair and lucrative. 
P. 316. 
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Administration has proposed additional IRS funding earmarked for 
increased enforcement programs,4 8 but regulators insist that the 
increases that have actually materialized have been too small to 
sustain an adequate level of enforcement.49 The current IRS 
Commissioner, who immediately succeeded Commissioner Rossotti, 
said early in his tenure that he intended to reinvigorate the IRS's 
enforcement programs,50 and new efforts have been taken by the IRS 
to increase its regulation of tax practitioners.51 In spite of these 
developments, the IRS Oversight Board has reported a trend of 
decreasing commitment to tax compliance by the general public.52 
In an effort "to protect taxpayers from zealous IRS agents," 
Johnston also proposes granting taxpayers whose returns were audited 
but showed no additional liability a $100 reward for their trouble (pp. 
316-17). It is unclear how such a program would guard against 
misconduct or abuse of discretion by examining agents. The $100 
reward could lead to inefficient and excessive auditing practices, 
encouraging IRS agents to assert insignificant issues in order to ensure 
some increase in the taxpayer's liability, no matter how small. 
In order to encourage timely filing and payment, Johnston also 
advocates publicizing whether a taxpayer filed the required returns 
and paid the accompanying tax liabilities. Whether Johnston believes 
that making such information available to the public would pressure 
taxpayers into reporting honestly or encourage taxpayers to rat out 
their neighbors also is not clear. Such a proposal, however, is 
inconsistent with the tax code's legitimate concern for taxpayer 
confidentiality and might occasion taxpayer distrust that could 
48. See George Guttman, The IRS's Fiscal 2004 Budget: More or Less?, 98 TAX NOTES 
486, 486 (2003); Allen Kenney, IRS Hopes for Funding Boost Dashed by House Bill, 104 
TAX NOTES 1475, 1475 (2004). 
49. Mark Everson, Everson Says IRS Budget Cut Would Jeopardize Enforcement 
Activities, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 189-22; Kenney, supra note 48, at 1476. The IRS 
Oversight Board, created by the reform legislation in 1998, is a frequent critic of inadequate 
IRS funding. See IRS OVERSIGHT BD., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2004) at http://www. 
treas.gov/irsob/documents/ 2004_annual_report.pdf ("The IRS Oversight Board has 
consistently argued that the IRS needs more resources to fight back and close the tax gap."). 
50. See Heidi Glenn, Everson Confirmed by Senate, 99 TAX NOTES 621 (2003) (quoting 
Everson as saying that the IRS "must strengthen its enforcement of tax laws and work with 
tax practitioners to ensure all taxpayers pay their fair share"). 
51. See Heather Bennett, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Everson Denounces Shelters, 
Warns Practitioners to Follow Law, 103 TAX NOTES 795 (2004) (reporting that the recently 
appointed IRS Director of Practice issued a warning to practitioners about eroding 
standards of conduct). 
52. IRS OVERSIGHT BD., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2004) at http://www.treas.gov 
irsob/documents/2004_annual_report.pdf (reporting a continuing decrease in the percentage 
of Americans who feel that it is not at all acceptable to cheat on their income taxes). 
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undermine voluntary compliance. 53 By contrast, Johnston's suggestion 
that the IRS should aggressively pursue tax evaders and promoters of 
evasion is a good one. Visible enforcement helps promote confidence 
in tax administration, which undergirds voluntary compliance. 54 
Although Johnston wants to "unshackle" the IRS, he does not 
specifically propose eliminating any of the 1998 "reforms." 5 5  The set of 
procedures enacted in 1998 probably increases perceptions of 
procedural fairness by allowing taxpayers additional procedural rights 
and opportunities to tell their side of the story, 5 6  but, ironically, the 
increase in taxpayer "rights" and the procedural requirements 
applicable to the tax dispute resolution process, particularly collection 
activities, along with a restruc::turing of the Agency, resulted in 
enforcement grinding almost to a halt for a period of time. 5 7  In a way, 
that is not surprising, because the procedural rules Congress enacted 
in the IRS Reform Act bear two hallmarks of complexity - they are 
both "dense" 5 8  and "technical." 59 And hindering IRS enforcement 
53. See l.R.C. § 6103(a) (declaring that tax returns and related information shall be 
confidential); see also Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2 003) ("[A] perception on the part of the public that the IRS does 
not respect their privacy interests could generate resentment and a diminished commitment 
towards compliance."). 
54. See generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in 
Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2 003). 
55. P. 316. Although Johnston does not say so here, this prescription may entail 
repealing the "ten deadly sins," which he criticized earlier in the book. See p. 150; supra text 
accompanying note 18. 
56. See Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax 
Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 22 3, 22 7 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992 ); see also 
Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 996-
1004 (2 003). 
57. See pp. 151-52 (reporting statistics); see also Lederman, supra note 56, at 983-88 
(same). 
58. In discussing legal complexity, Professor Schuck refers to rules that "occupy a large 
portion of the relevant policy space and seek to control a broad range of conduct, which 
causes them to collide and conflict with their animating policies with some frequency" as 
"dense" rules. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 
42 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1992 ). Although he does not specifically refer to procedural rules, the 
term should be just as applicable in the procedural context. 
59. Id. at 4. Schuck has written that: 
Technical rules require special sophistication or expertise on the part of those who wish to 
understand and apply them. Technicality is a function of the fineness of the distinctions a 
rule makes, the specialized terminology it employs, and the refined substantive judgments it 
requires. The Internal Revenue Code is probably the leading example of technical rules. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Again, Schuck does not expressly refer in this context to the 
complexity of procedural rules, but the analysis remains applicable. For example, the 
collection due process procedures enacted in 1998 entail fine distinctions, specialized 
terminology, and refined judgments by both the IRS and the United States Tax Court. See 
Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction? 
41 Hous. L. REV. 1145 (2 004); Danshera Cords, How Much Process is Due?: l.R.C. Sections 
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action apparently was not far from the minds of some legislators, who 
stated such things as: 
I think a recent Newsweek Magazine article said it best: The IRS has too 
much muscle, too much money, and too little oversight. The agency is 
out of control and it is not going to fix itself. Only Congress can do that. 
In my view, we should overhaul - if not eventually abolish - the IRS. 
Then we should scrap the Tax Code and replace it with one that is fairer 
and flatter.6() 
The hand-tying procedural complexity here, unlike in other 
contexts, does not consist of administrative exhaustion requirements 
or other rules that limit the rights of complainants. 61 Instead, it is the 
Agency itself that suffers the constraints of procedural complexity. 62 
Procedural complexity in tax administration should concern Johnston 
because it facilitates noncompliance by those seeking to postpone or 
avoid payment. For example, many tax protestors have taken 
advantage of the collection due process procedures. 63 Additional 
procedures also require additional IRS time, so that the IRS cannot 
process as many cases with the same number of employees. 
6320 and 6330 Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51 (2004); cf Richard E. 
Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 473, 505 (2003) ("As history has shown, adding procedures may ossify the 
administrative process and sacrifice the ability of agencies to take effective action."). 
60. 143 CONG. REC. E2306 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Riley); see also 
Lederman, supra note 56, at 1010 n.188 (quoting other statements in the congressional 
record). More recently, Congressman J. Dennis Hastert called for the passage of a flat tax 
and the elimination of the IRS. See DENNY HASTERT, SPEAKER: LESSONS FROM FORTY 
YEARS IN COACHING AND POLITICS 272 (2004). 
61. Cf Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1650-51 (2003). 
Professor Schlanger explains: 
(T]he [Prison Litigation Reform Act] imposes no constraints on the structure or rules of any 
grievance processing regime. The administrative review scheme can, for example, have as 
short a deadline for inmates and as many layers of review (to each of which the inmate must 
apply) as the incarcerating authority chooses. Essentially, then, the sky's the limit for the 
procedural complexity or difficulty of the exhaustion regime. 
Id. at 1650 (footnote omitted). 
62. One type of procedural complexity agencies can be faced with is in prescribing rules 
or regulations that properly implement legislative mandates. See Stephen T. Maher, Getting 
Into the Act, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 277, 285 (1994) ("Agencies that implement legislative 
mandates sometimes have difficulty complying with procedural complexities while adopting 
rules. The more complex the rulemaking procedure, the more likely it is that agencies will 
make mistakes."). 
63. Professor Camp explains: 
As implemented, the (collection due process (CDP)] provisions have been a boon to tax 
protestors and a pain to everyone else. As of July 31, 2003, a review of the LEXIS database 
shows that since RRA 98's enactment, courts have decided 328 appeals from CDP hearings. 
Of those, at least 145 involved taxpayers who could reasonably be called tax protestors. 
Camp, supra note 18, at 122 (footnote omitted). 
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David Bradford has distinguished among three, often 
interconnected, types of tax complexity: 
"compliance complexity" (referring to the problems faced by the 
taxpayer in keeping records, choosing forms, making necessary 
calculations, and so on); "transactional complexity" (referring to the 
problems faced by taxpayers in organizing their affairs so as to minimize 
their taxes within the framework of the rules); and "rule complexity" 
(referring to the problems of interpreting the written and unwritten 
rules).64 
Each of these are clearly related to the application of substantive tax 
law to taxpayers (the regulated). They are not directly applicable to 
the IRS (the apparent regulator). Procedural complexity, however, 
imposes compliance complexity and rule complexity costs on the IRS 
- albeit different versions of these types of complexity from those 
that taxpayers face. In essence, the IRS functions as the regulated in 
its interactions with Congress, its regulator. 
Thus, procedures enacted to help the "little guy" stand up to the 
IRS, such as those that restrict seizure of principal residences 6 5  and 
assets used in a business, 6 6  as well as the collection due process 
procedures, 67 while protecting some taxpayers, have imposed costs on 
the IRS. 6 8  These procedures impose genuine restrictions and delays on 
IRS action, both by requiring the IRS to surmount additional 
procedural hurdles, such as sending additional notices, 69 and because 
they provide taxpayers with procedural rights that require Agency 
time.70 The cost of any particular provision in isolation may be less 
64. BRADFORD, supra note 43, at 266-67. 
65. See I.RC. § 6334(e)(l) (requiring approval of the U.S. district court before the IRS 
may levy on a taxpayer's principal residence). 
66. See id. § 6334(e)(2) (requiring approval of the IRS district director before the IRS 
may levy on certain assets used by a taxpayer in his trade or business). 
67. See Camp, supra note 18, at 121 ("[T)he collection due process provisions . . . 
undermine the Service's tax liability decisionmaking."). 
68. Professor Boris Bittker has advanced what Peter Schuck terms the "audience 
principle," which "holds that the complexity of a rule should be tailored to the sophistication 
and cost-bearing capacities of those who will have to interpret and implement it." See 
Schuck, supra note 59, at 45 (citing Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 5 (1974)). This analysis applies equally well to the IRS as it does to 
taxpayers. That is, the IRS apparently did not have the capacity to bear the costs of 
restructuring the Agency and implementing numerous complex procedures while 
maintaining the same level of enforcement of the tax laws. 
69. See, e.g. , I.RC. § 6330 (requiring pre-levy notice of right to collection due process 
hearing); id § 6751 (requiring detailed penalty notices); id. § 7609 (requiring the IRS to 
notify taxpayer of third-party summons); cf id. § 6404(g) (suspending accrual of interest on 
tax deficiency and accrual of certain penalties if IRS does not notify taxpayer of asserted 
deficiency within a certain period of time). 
70. See, e.g. , id. § 6015 (expanding the grounds upon which a spouse may be relived of 
joint and several liability); id. § 6320 (requiring post-lien filing opportunity for a hearing at 
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noticeable than its benefits, but the aggregate costs of procedural 
complexity are too large to be assumed away, because, as Johnston 
points out, the costs of IRS inaction are also borne by taxpayers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Johnston is certainly not the first author to reveal instances of 
corporate welfare, to allege political corruption within the IRS, or to 
point out political manipulation of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Academics have debated these issues on a much broader scale than 
Johnston does in his book. Perfectly Legal is not an academic 
monograph, nor is it intended to be. Citations are scarce and some of 
those that exist cite to Johnston's own New York Times articles (see 
pp. 319-27). Nonetheless, Johnston generally demonstrates a 
command of substantive tax law, as well as an understanding of tax 
compliance and the economics of the topics he discusses.71 The fact 
that he does not address economic theories in depth generally does 
not detract from his arguments and also may explain why the book 
remains interesting and lively. In certain instances, however, his 
efforts to draw conclusions with a broad brush lead to inconsistent 
statements and unanswered questions. 
The book also suffers from a lack of organization, so that the focus 
sometimes switches abruptly from one chapter to the next, but this 
undermines the case Johnston is trying to make more than it affects 
the book's readability. Once the argument Johnston makes is 
considered carefully, the pattern that emerges from the series of 
narratives that comprise Perfectly Legal is not so much an 
investigative report of the tax system, but rather a populist lament in 
which the greed of the top executives of large corporations bears as 
much responsibility as lawmakers do. 
Undoubtedly, not everyone will agree with Johnston that 
corporations and Congress have combined in a "covert campaign," but 
Perfectly Legal is an enjoyable and informative read nonetheless. 
Johnston is a good storyteller and Perfectly Legal is an interesting 
book that should be accessible and informative to the general public. 
Johnston also raises important issues about the tax system that 
ordinarily are not the focus of books of this type. His report on the 
workings of the IRS is both unusual in its perspective and very 
informative. Johnston's analysis of the federal law that tied the hands 
the IRS Appeals Division); id. § 6330 (requiring pre-levy opportunity for a hearing at the 
IRS Appeals Division); id. § 7491 (shifting the burden of proof to the IRS in court cases if 
the taxpayer establishes necessary elements); id. § 7609(a) (expanding taxpayers' right to 
quash third-party summons). 
71. According to Johnston's web site, he was a student of economics at several colleges, 
including the University of Chicago. See http://www.perfectlylegalthebook.com/author.htm. 
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of the IRS also underscores the importance of simplification - not 
just of substantive tax law, but of procedural tax law as well. 
